The Relationship of Natural Law and Natural Rights by Tattay, Szilárd
The Relationship of Natural Law
and Natural Rights: Organic, Contingent,
or Logically Contradictory?
Szilárd Tattay
Introduction: two fundamental questions
Few would doubt the widespread commonplace in the history of ideas that natural
rights were conceived from natural law. Nevertheless, the nature of the relationship
between natural law and natural rights is far from being unambiguous. Although
several competitive theories arose to explain this relationship, the debate around it
has not come to an end.
It seems that the two most fundamental and most difficult questions in this
regard are
(1) whether the ‘encounter’ between the concepts of natural law and natural
rights in a certain period of the history of Western political and legal thought was
necessary or merely accidental, and
(2) whether there is an organic, contingent, or logically contradictory relation-
ship between these two concepts.
e relation between natural law and natural rights raises further issues as well.
Is natural law or are natural rights entitled to logical primacy and is it possible to
derive natural rights fromnatural law or vice versa? If above all obligations originate
from natural law, what and how could establish a relationship between the norms
of natural law and natural rights? Do natural rights only serve to fulĕl obligations
arising from natural law, or is their scope wider than this, and so and so forth?
In this paper I will try to answer only the two ‘fundamental questions’. As it
seems to me, these two questions are interrelated, and the answer to the ĕrst one
is ultimately dependent upon the consideration of the second. e starting point
of my argumentation is the statement that the ‘intermediate period’ between the
thirteenth century, commonly regarded as the golden age of scholasticism, and the
seventeenth century marking the beginning of modern natural law theory is essen-
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tial concerning the evolution of the idea of natural rights. us the main reason
why the problem of the relationship between natural law and natural rights is di-
viding historians of ideas and provides them with false ambiguities is that up to
recent times they have neglected the thorough examination of these three and a
half centuries between Saint omas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius.
Two diametrically opposed answers
ere are two easily tangible, crystallised and characteristic opinions considering
the historical relationship between natural law and natural rights. According to the
ĕrst view, initiated by Leo Strauss and Michel Villey, there is a mutually exclusive
relationship, or at least a fundamental tension and historical discontinuity between
the ideas of natural law and natural rights. Strauss maintains that the authentic,
classical tradition of natural law declined when (and not to a negligible extent be-
cause) natural rights arose. Modernity took over temporarily the concept of natural
law inherited from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, but transformed it according to
the axioms of modern philosophy, made it secondary and derivative compared to
the concept of rights and ĕnally abandoned it (see esp. Strauss 1953). Michel Vil-
ley is even more categorical. e French legal philosopher sees an absolute logical
incompatibility between the ideas of natural law and natural rights, and claims that
while the classical concept of ‘ius’ meant the constraint of all power, the modern
notion of ‘iura’ means the theoretically unrestricted power of the individual (Villey
1975, 227–230).
e other general opinion is diametrically opposed to the previous one, as it
regards the seventeenth-eighteenth-century modern variant of natural law rather
than its classical version as a point of departure and ideal-typical (see e.g. Haakons-
sen 1996, Hochstrasser 2000). According to this approach, there is a close relation-
ship and codependency between the ideas of natural law and natural rights. In this
view, the most remarkable and imperishable merit of natural law theories is the
elaboration of the idea of natural rights (see e.g. Péteri 1988, Gérard 2007). If we
pursue this reasoning further, we may even arrive at the conclusion that nowadays,
when jusnaturalism is considered to be aminority view in jurisprudence, besides its
official advocates this approach endures latently – as a subterranean river – in the
works of such human rights theoreticians as Ronald Dworkin, who cannot or are
not willing to come to common grounds with natural law due to their dedication
to analytical philosophy.Ƭ
Ƭ Dworkin was even labelled as a natural lawyer; he wrote as a response Dworkin (1982).
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The conventional story
In order to do justice between these opposite views, we have to examine at least
the major stages in the history of the idea of natural law from the perspective of
natural rights. Ancient theories of natural law are not taken into account, since nei-
ther Greek philosophers nor Roman lawyers knew the concept of natural rights; at
least we do not have indisputable evidence that they did.ƭ e concept of subjec-
tive rights founded on the immanent value of the individual could have been made
compatible with Aristotle’s metaphysical realism only with great difficulty, mainly
because of his holistic approach subordinating parts to the whole.Ʈ
Aquinas who offered a paradigmatic formulation of medieval natural law the-
ories only occasionally used the word ‘ius’ in a subjective meaning. For him, ius is
above all an objective concept, a synonym for ‘iustum’, i.e. the object of justice, the
primary meaning of which is the just thing or action.⁴
Aer discussing Aquinas’s doctrine, the works that deal with natural law the-
ories or the history of legal philosophy in general usually skip over or only brieĘy
outline the legal thought of latemedieval andRenaissance scholasticism andpick up
the threads of the theories of natural law in the seventeenth century, with omas
Hobbes (or maybe Hugo Grotius). It is exactly here that the books on the history of
natural rights usually start (see e.g. Macpherson 1962).
us I continue my brief historical sketch with the author of the Leviathan.
According to Strauss’s inĘuential thesis, Hobbes deduces the laws of nature from
natural rights (Strauss 1952, 157). is thesis is widely accepted but questionable.
While it seems incontestable that in Hobbes’s political philosophy natural rights
have priority over natural laws, it does not necessarily follow that laws of nature
are derivative of natural rights. On the contrary, it seems that Hobbes himself ex-
cludes this possibility when he draws an impenetrable demarcation line between
the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘law’:
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right
and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because R, consisteth in lib-
erty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas L, determineth, and bindeth to one of
ƭ According to Richard Tuck (1979, 10–13), in late Roman Empire the words ‘ius’ and ‘dominium’
were oen used in a meaning that in many ways resembles the modern concept of ‘right’. Even if
we were to accept this claim, it would not change the basic fact that Roman jurisprudence had no
conception of universal natural rights inhering in all persons by virtue of their humanity (Tierney
2002, 392).
Ʈ Fred D. Miller has argued in his monograph on Aristotle’s Politics (1995, ch. 4) that the Greek
philosopher had already used the language of subjective natural rights. His arguments, however,
do not seem to be convincing.
⁴ I have discussed Aquinas’s different usages of ius in detail in Tattay (2012).
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them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which
in one and the same matter are inconsistent. (Leviathan ch. 14, 189)⁵
Hobbes consistently maintains this strict differentiation between law and right
when he deĕnes the concepts of ‘right of nature’ and ‘law of nature’. According to
his deĕnitions, while the right of nature means the freedom to protect our own life,
the law of nature forbids us to end our life, and also commands us to do everything
possible to protect it.⁶ If right and law are such incompatible concepts, then the
laws of nature cannot be derived from the fundamental right of self-preservation.
Although either the natural rights or the laws of nature can be deduced from our
innate instinct to preserve our life, it would be rather difficult to posit an organic, if
any connection between them.
On the other hand, since Hobbes does not require moral rightness as a concep-
tual element of natural rights, he excludes the possibility that they could be regu-
lated ormeasured by the laws of nature.us natural laws cannot frame and restrict
rights, the result of which is that in the state of nature ‘every man has a Right to ev-
ery thing; even to one anothers body’ (ibid. 190). Moreover, it is doubtful whether
the laws of nature are able to ĕt into this role at all, inasmuch as their normative
status is questionable. Hobbes’s point of view is rather ambiguous as to whether
the laws of nature are commands expressing the will of the sovereign and omnipo-
tent God, and hence are real laws, or merely ‘theorems’, ‘conclusions’ set by human
reason in order to secure peace, which could only be called laws in a metaphorical
sense (rules of the game, so to say).⁷
In his early Latin work on natural law John Locke takes over Hobbes’s strict
separation of law and right, law of nature and right of nature. As he claims, ‘law of
nature’ should be conceptually differentiated from ‘natural right’,
for right is grounded in the fact that we have the free use of a thing, whereas
law is what enjoins or forbids the doing of a thing. Hence, this law of nature
can be described as being the decree of the divine will discernible by the light
⁵ All references to Leviathan will be to C. B. Macpherson’s edition (1982).
⁶ Ibid.: ‘T R  N, whichWriters commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man
hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his ownNature; that is to say,
of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason,
hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. […] A L  N, (Lex Naturalis,) is a
Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away themeans of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which
he thinketh it may be best preserved.’
⁷ Ibid. ch. 15, 216–217: ‘ese dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improp-
erly: for they are but Conclusions, or eoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation
and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command
over others. But yet if we consider the same eoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by
right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.’
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of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with rational
nature, and for this very reason commanding or prohibiting. (Essays on the
Law of Nature 110–111)⁸
Later, in the Two Treatises of Government, he modiĕes his opinion and asserts
that law not so much limits as directs free and intelligent human beings according
to their real interests.⁹ e true end of law is thus ‘not to abolish or restrain, but to
preserve and enlarge Freedom’ (ibid. 306, emphasis omitted). On the other hand,
Locke’s concept of man as the ‘owner of himself ’, which grounds natural rights,
seems, in the ĕnal analysis, incompatible with his other fundamental argument that
provides the basis for natural law, stating that man as God’s creature belongs to God
as His property. Consequently, in certain cases Locke has to give up, even if implic-
itly, the latter argument – for instance, by allowing suicide in certain cases (Zuckert
1997, 725).Ƭ⁰
The alternative story
So far, our historical analysis seems to justify Strauss’s and Villey’s discontinuity
thesis. e main reason for this might be indicated by the fact that modern natural
law theorists were inclined to regard natural law as a sum of moral precepts that
strictly prescribe or prohibit certain acts, thus impeding the individual’s freedom of
action. As a result of this formalist or legalist approach, they could not formulate
natural rights on the basis of natural law, only parallel to the laws of nature, or rather
against them.
However, as I suggested above, if we extend our study to the period between
Aquinas and Hobbes (or Grotius), the problem of the relationship between natu-
ral law and natural rights appears in a different light. In his classical edition of the
Leviathan from 1946, Michael Oakeshott was one of the ĕrst to warn that
⁸ I am using Wolfgang von Leyden’s edition and translation of 1970. ‘Haec lex his insignita appel-
lationibus a jure naturali distinguenda est: jus enim in eo positum est quod alicujus rei liberum
habemus usum, lex vero id est quod aliquid agendum jubet vel vetat. Haec igitur lex naturae ita de-
scribi potest quod sit ordinatio voluntatis divinae lumine naturae cognoscibilis, quid cum natura
rationali conveniens vel disconveniens sit indicans eoque ipso jubens aut prohibens.’
⁹ Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett’s edition, 1988) bk. 2, ch. 6, § 57, 305: ‘For Law, in its
true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his
proper Interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law.
Could they be happier without it, the Law, as an useless thing would of it self vanish; and that ill
deserves the Name of Conĕnement which hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices’ (emphasis
omitted).
Ƭ⁰ In the Two Treatises of Government (bk. 2, ch. 4, § 23, 284) Locke writes of the slave who, ‘by his
fault, forfeited his own Life’ that ‘whenever he ĕnds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value
of his Life, ’tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he
desires.’
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Hobbes was born into the world, not only of modern science, but also of me-
dieval thought. e scepticism and the individualism, which are the founda-
tions of his civil philosophy, were the gis of late scholastic nominalism; the
displacement of Reason in favour of will and imagination and the emancipa-
tion of passion were slowly mediated changes in European thought that had
gone far before Hobbes wrote […] the greatness of Hobbes is not that he began
a new tradition in this respect but that he constructed a political philosophy
that reĘected the changes in the European intellectual consciousness which
had been pioneered chieĘy by the theologians of the ĕeenth and sixteenth
centuries. (Oakeshott 1991, 278)
Since then several books and articles have pointed at the medieval origins of
the idea of natural rights – with different emphases and in different ways. Even if
some of their statements seem questionable today, Georges de Lagarde’s andMichel
Villey’s works were pioneers in this regard. Both French authors were convinced
that the fourteenth-century philosopher and theologian William Ockham could
be regarded as the ‘father’ of natural rights (Lagarde 1934–1946, Villey 1975).ƬƬ
Richard Tuck’sNatural Rightseories constituted a similar breakthrough inAnglo-
American historiography. On the one hand, Tuck traced the concept of natural
rights back to the revival of legal science in the twelh century; on the other hand,
he claimed that the ĕrst ‘fully Ęedged’ theory of natural rights was developed in the
ĕeenth century by the conciliarist and mystic Jean Gerson (Tuck 1979, 13, 25).
Research in this ĕeld has been deĕnitely blossoming in the last decadesƬƭ and
reached its peak inBrianTierney’s andAnnabel Brett’s overarching, thoroughmono-
graphs. Both discuss the continuousmedieval evolution of the idea of natural rights
in detail, from twelh-century canon law to the so-called ‘Second Scholasticism’ of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Tierney 1997, Brett 1997). We clearly get
the impression from these works that modernity inherited not only the concept
of natural law but also that of natural rights from scholasticism – and then trans-
formed them into its own image. As Tierney pertinently noticed, ‘if a doctrine of
rights had not grownup in an earlier,more religiously oriented culture, therewould,
so to speak, have been nothing there to secularize’ (Tierney 2006, 195–196). is
picture fundamentally contests the common view that the idea of natural rights is a
distinctively modern phenomenon that ĕrst appeared in the seventeenth century,
as a political-legal consequence of the rise of modern science and market economy
and the philosophical individualism of the age.ƬƮ
ƬƬ See also Lagarde (1956–1970), Villey (1962), Villey (1964).
Ƭƭ e main fruits of this blossoming are the following books and studies: McGrade (1980), Tierney
(1988), Tierney (1989), Reid (1991), Pennington (1993),Mäkinen (2001), Oakley (2005),Mäkinen
and Korkman (2006).
ƬƮ Perhaps the most prominent representatives of this view are – in their very different ways – Leo
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But let us return to our original problem concerning the conceptual relation-
ship of natural law and natural rights. According to modern deontic logic, a plau-
sible way of grounding rights is to derive them from permissive norms (see e.g.
Kalinowski 1964). However, the formalist approach of seventeenth-century natu-
ral law theorists, as we have seen, seems to exclude this possibility.Ƭ⁴ Medieval legal
thinking, on the contrary, knew the concept of ‘permissive natural law’.e essence
of this idea is that natural law does allow and approve certain courses of action,
without however commanding (or forbidding) them, and thereby gives freedom of
choice toman –within the framework determined by the precepts and prohibitions
of natural law.
Just like the idea of natural rights, the doctrine of permissive natural law has its
roots in twelh-century canon law, and was originally inspired by the problem of
private property. Gratian’s theory caused great interpretative difficulties to the De-
cretists. At the beginning of theDecretumGratian gave a deĕnition of ius naturale –
taken from Isidore of Seville – encompassing both common possession and acqui-
sition of things.Ƭ⁵ en he attributed common property to natural law and private
ownership to human positive law and custom, writing a bit later that human laws
contrary to natural law are invalid.Ƭ⁶ It was Ruĕnus whose solution to this diffi-
culty became the most widely accepted. He contrasted natural law commands and
prohibitions with demonstrationes (indications), ‘which nature does not forbid nor
command but shows to be good’, and classiĕed common property only under the
demonstrationes of natural law susceptible to change by human law.Ƭ⁷ It was another
Italian canonist of the twelh century, Huguccio, who developed this distinction
further and thus introduced the notion of ‘permissive natural law’:
Strauss and Crawford Brough Macpherson; see Strauss (1953), Macpherson (1962). To take an-
other illustrative example of this modernist standpoint, in Norberto Bobbio’s book on Hobbes and
the natural law tradition, we can also read that ‘the theory of natural rights is born with Hobbes’
(Bobbio 1993, 154).
Ƭ⁴ Although Grotius and Locke sometimes refer to the permissive norms of natural law, these refer-
ences remain sporadic.
Ƭ⁵ Concordia discordantium canonum d. 1 c.7: ‘Ius naturale est commune omniumnationum, eo quod
ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et feminae coniunctio, liberorum
successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium une libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae
celo, terra marique capiuntur; item depositae rei vel commendatae pecuniae restitutio, violentiae
per vim repulsio’ (emphasis added). Isidore offered this deĕnition in Etymologiae 5.4.1–2.
Ƭ⁶ Concordia discordantium canonum d. 8 ante c.1: ‘Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus
[…] Iure vero consuetudinis vel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud vero alterius.’ Ibid. post c.1:
‘Dignitate vero ius naturale simpliciter prevalet consuetudini et constitutioni. Quecunque enim
vel moribus recepta sunt, vel scriptis comprehensa, si naturali iuri fuerint adversa, vana et irrita
sunt habenda.’
Ƭ⁷ Summa decretorum d. 1: ‘Consistit autem ius naturale in tribus, scilic.: mandatis, prohibitionibus,
demonstrationibus. Mandat namque quod prosit, ut: “diliges Dominum Deum tuum”; prohibet
quod ledit, ut: “non occides”; demonstrat quod convenit, ut “omnia in commune habeantur”, ut:
“omnium una sit libetas”, et huiusmodi. […] Detractum autem ei est non utique in mandatis vel
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By natural law something ismine and something is yours, but this is by permis-
sion, not by precept, since divine law never commanded that all things be com-
mon or that some things be private, but it permitted that all things be common
and some private, and so by natural law something is common and something
private. (Summa decretorum d. 1 c. 7)Ƭ⁸
e idea of permissive natural law soon pervaded not only canon law but also
theology and was frequently invoked as a ground of natural rights. Its most detailed
exposition was provided by the Spanish Jesuit theologian Francisco Suárez at the
beginning of the seventeenth century.Ƭ⁹ For Suárez, permissive natural law plays a
primordial role in the foundation of natural rights. Generally speaking, permissive
natural law deĕnes an area within which human persons can licitly exercise their
inherent power of free will and free choice. More concretely, when natural law per-
mits an otherwise intrinsically good act, ‘it not only does not prohibit it, but since it
is good, it also grants a positive faculty or licence, or a certain right to it.’ƭ⁰ It should
be stressed that for Suárez there cannot be a contradiction between the permis-
sions and the precepts of natural law: permissive natural law can never permit or
give right to immoral acts that are contrary to preceptive natural law.us the com-
mands and prohibitions of natural law set bounds to the exercise of natural rights
and prevent right-holders from abusing their rights (Tierney 2002, 401, 405–406).
Finally, what is perhaps even more important, preceptive natural law obliges others
to respect the rights conferred by permissive natural law:
e right to all these things is natural, that is, they are all permitted by the law
of nature. And in the same way the obligation of one person not to violate such
a right of another is of natural law. (De legibus 2.18.7)ƭƬ
prohibitionibus, que derogationem nullam sentire queunt, sed in demonstrationibus – que scil.
natura non vetat non precipit, sed bona esse ostendit – et maxime in omnium una libertate et
communi possessione; nunc enim iure civili hic est servus meus, ille est ager tuus.’
Ƭ⁸ ‘De iure naturali aliquid est meum et aliquid est tuum, set de permissione, non de precepto, quia
ius divinum numquam precipit omnia esse communia vel aliqua esse propria, set permittit omnia
esse communia et aliqua esse propria et ita de iure naturali aliquid est commune et aliquid est
proprium’. Cited by Weigand (1967, 353). It should be noted that Huguccio himself did not adopt
the above ‘common explanation’. Instead, he argued that natural law commands that everything be
common (communis) only in the sense that private possessions are to be shared (communicanda)
with others in time of need (Tierney 2001, 385 n. 16).
Ƭ⁹ I have analysed Suárez’s conception of permissive natural law and its organic relation to the tradi-
tional (omist) and subjective understandings of ius in Tattay 2011.
ƭ⁰ De legibus (Pereña edition, 1971–1981) 1.15.11: ‘Nam quando permissio dicitur de actu alias bono,
non solum non prohibet illum: sed etiam cum sit bonus, dat positivam facultatem, seu licentiam,
vel ius aliquod ad illum.’
ƭƬ ‘Nam ius ad haec omnia naturale est, id est, haec omnia licita sunt iure naturae. Et eodem modo
obligatio unius ad non violandum tale ius alterius, naturalis legis est.’
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So Suárez attaches natural rights to natural law in at least three ways. First, it
is permissive natural law that constitutes their normative basis. Secondly, the com-
mands and prohibitions of preceptive natural law set limits to natural rights and
ensure their lawful exercise. irdly, the same law protects natural rights against
violation by others.
Conclusion
At the end of our investigation in the history of the ideas of natural law and nat-
ural rights we need to revise our temporary judgement and arrive at the following
conclusion: Not only is there no necessary organic relationship between the ideas of
natural law and natural rights, there is no necessary conceptual opposition between
them either.While the tension between these two ideas was palpable in themodern,
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century doctrines of natural law, it was essentially ab-
sent from earlier scholastic theories. On the whole, their historical encounter can
be regarded as accidental, for it is possible to found a coherent theory of natural
law merely on natural obligations. Nevertheless, under certain conditions they can
complement each other favourably.e concept of permissive natural law provides
a theoretical framework for such complementarity.
References
Bobbio, Norberto. 1993. omas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. Trans-
lated by Daniela Gobetti. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brett, Annabel. 1997. Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholas-
tic ought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1982. ‘Natural’ Law Revisited.University of Florida Law Review
34: 165–188.
Gérard, Philippe. 2007. L’ esprit des droits: Philosophie des droits de l’homme. Brus-
sels: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis.
Gratian. 1959. Concordia discordantium canonum. In Corpus iuris canonici, edited
by E. Friedberg, vol. 1. Graz: Akademische.
Haakonssen, Knud. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the
Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes,omas. 1982.Leviathan. Edited byCrawfordB.Macpherson.Harmonds-
worth: Penguin.
Hochstrasser, Tim J. 2000.Natural Laweories in the Early Enlightenment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
26 Szilárd Tattay
Kalinowski, Georges. 1964. Logique et philosophie du droit subjectif. Archives de
philosophie du droit 9: 37–43.
Lagarde, Georges de. 1934–1946. La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin duMoyen
Age, 6 vols. Paris: Béatrice.
Lagarde, Georges de. 1956–1970. La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin duMoyen
Age, 2nd, rev. ed., 5 vols. Louvain – Paris: Nauwelaerts – Béatrice.
Locke, John. 1970. Essays on the Law of Nature: e Latin Text with a Translation,
Introduction and Notes. Edited and translated by Wolfgang von Leyden. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Locke, John. 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macpherson, Crawford B. 1962. e Political eory of Possessive Individualism:
Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mäkinen, Virpi. 2001. Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Francis-
can Poverty. Leuven: Peeters.
Mäkinen, Virpi, and Korkman, Petter (eds.) 2006. Transformations in Medieval
and Early-Modern Rights Discourse. New York: Springer.
McGrade, Arthur S. 1980. Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights. In Author-
ity and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter
Ullmann on His Seventieth Birthday, edited by Brian Tierney and Peter Line-
han, 149–165. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, Fred D. 1995. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Cla-
rendon Press.
Oakeshott, Michael. 1991. Introduction to Leviathan. In idem, Rationalism in Pol-
itics and Other Essays, 221–294. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Oakley, Francis. 2005.Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and
Discontinuity in the History of Ideas. New York – London: Continuum.
Pennington, Kenneth. 1993. e Prince and the Law, 1200–1600: Sovereignty and
Rights in theWestern Legal Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Péteri, Zoltán. 1988. Az emberi jogok a történelemben [HumanRights inHistory].
In Emberi jogok hazánkban [HumanRights inHungary], edited byMárta Ka-
tonáné Soltész, 21–49. Budapest: ELTE Jogi Továbbképző Intézet.
Reid, Charles J. 1991. e Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradi-
tion: An Historical Inquiry. Boston College Law Review 33: 37–92.
Singer, Heinrich (ed.) 1963. Die Summa decretorum des Magister Ruĕnus. Aalen:
Scientia.
The Relationship of Natural Law and Natural Rights 27
Strauss, Leo. 1952. e Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis.
Translated by Elsa M. Sinclair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1953.Natural Right andHistory. Chicago:University ofChicagoPress.
Suárez, Francisco. 1971–1981. De legibus. Edited by Luciano Pereña et al., 8 vols.
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientíĕcas.
Tattay, Szilárd. 2011. e Subjective Concept of Right in Francisco Suárez. In Le-
gal and Political eory in the Post-National Age, edited by Péter Cserne and
Miklós Könczöl, 7–17. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Tattay, Szilárd. 2012. Are ere any Natural Rights in Aquinas? In Jurisprudence
and Political Philosophy in the 21st Century: Reassessing Legacies, edited by
Miodrag A. Jovanović and Bojan Spaić, 11–22. Frankfurt am Main: Peter
Lang.
Tierney, Brian. 1988. Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Natural Rights. In e
Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion: A Tribute to Harold
J. Berman, edited by JohnWitte and Frank S. Alexander, 1–31. Atlanta: Schol-
ars Press.
Tierney, Brian. 1989. Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts,
1150–1250. History of Political ought 10: 615–646.
Tierney, Brian. 1997.e Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural
Law and Church Law, 1150–1625. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Tierney, Brian. 2001. Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant. Journal of the
History of Ideas 62: 381–399.
Tierney, Brian. 2002. Natural Law and Natural Rights: Old Problems and Recent
Approaches.e Review of Politics 64: 389–406.
Tierney, Brian. 2006. Dominion of Self and Natural Rights Before Locke and Af-
ter. In Mäkinen and Korkman (2006), 173–203.
Tuck, Richard. 1979.Natural Rightseories:eir Origin and Development. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Villey, Michel. 1962. Les origines de la notion du droit subjectif. In idem, Lecons
d’histoire de la philosophie du droit, 221–249. Paris: Dalloz.
Villey,Michel. 1964. La genèse dudroit subjectif chezGuillaumed’Occam.Archives
de philosophie du droit 9: 97–127.
Villey, Michel. 1975. La formation de la pensée juridique moderne: Cours d’histoire
de la philosophie du droit, 4th ed. Paris: Montchrestien.
Weigand, Rudolf. 1967.DieNaturrechtslehre der Legisten undDekretisten von Irner-
ius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes Teutonicus.München: Hueber.
Zuckert, Michael. 1997. Do Natural Rights Derive from Natural Law? Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 20: 695–731.
